12
hospitalisation can be halved by intense surveillance, then the probability that an imported 25 case leads to sustained transmission is only 0.005. This emphasises the importance of 26 current surveillance efforts in countries around the world, to ensure that the ongoing 27 outbreak will not become a large global epidemic. The infectious agent driving the ongoing pneumonia outbreak (the 2019-nCoV) appears 36 to have transitioned from animals into humans at Huanan seafood wholesale market in 37
Wuhan, China [1-5]. Since then, cases have been recorded in other countries, and initial 38 estimates suggest a case fatality rate of around 14% [6] . Even countries without 39 confirmed cases are on high alert. For example, the United Kingdom has not yet seen a 40 confirmed case, but officials are reported to be attempting to trace as many as 2,000 41 visitors that have travelled to that country from Wuhan. 42
43
The most devastating infectious disease outbreaks are those that have a wide 44 geographical distribution, as opposed to being confined to a small region [7, 8] . The 45 previously known virus that is most similar to the 2019-nCoV is the SARS coronavirus [9], 46 which generated cases in 37 countries in 2002-03 [9,10]. Since the 2019-nCoV is clearly capable of being transmitted by infected hosts to countries around the world, an important 48 question for policy makers is whether or not these imported cases have the potential to 49 generate sustained human-to-human transmission in new locations. 50
51
Here, we present data describing the times from symptom onset to hospitalisation for 47 52 patients from the current outbreak, obtained from publicly available line lists [11] . We fit 53 an exponential distribution to these data, accounting for uncertainty due to the limited 54 numbers of patients from whom data were available. Assuming that this distribution 55 characterises the time spent by infected hosts generating new transmissions in the 56 community, it is then possible to infer the probability that a case arriving in a new location 57 is followed by an outbreak driven by sustained human-to-human transmission. We 58 estimate this probability under the assumption that the transmissibility of the 2019-nCoV 59 is similar to that of the SARS coronavirus, and then go on to consider the effect of The distribution of times from symptom onset to hospitalisation was estimated using 69 patient data from the ongoing outbreak [11] (data are shown in Fig 1A) . Since the precise 70 times of symptom onset and hospitalisation on the dates concerned were unknown, we 71 converted the times from symptom onset to hospitalisation to intervals describing possible 72 time periods. For example, for a case showing symptoms on 9 January 2020, and then 73 being hospitalised on 14 January 2020, the time between symptom onset and 74 hospitalisation lies between four and six days (see e.g. [12] for a similar calculation). 75
76
We then fitted the parameter ( ) of an exponential distribution to these interval-censored 77 data using Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). A chain of length 100,000,000 in addition 78 to a burn-in of 100,000 was used. The chain was then sampled every 100 steps, giving 79 rise to a range of n = 1,000,000 equally possible distributions for the times from symptom 80 onset to hospitalisation, each characterised by a parameter estimate " ( = 1,2, . . . , ). 81
82
Estimating the probability of sustained transmission 83
84
The distributions of times from symptom onset to hospitalisation were used to estimate 85 the probability that an imported case will lead to sustained transmission, by assuming that 86 infections occur according to a branching process (e.g. [13] [14] [15] ). In this branching 87 process, the effective reproduction number (accounting for control interventions, other 88 than intensified surveillance which we model explicitly) of the 2019-nCoV when the virus 89 arrives in a new location is denoted by = / , where the parameter represents 90 pathogen transmissibility [16] . We assumed that the transmissibility of the virus is similar 91 to that of the SARS coronavirus, i.e. = -./--./-, where -./-= 3 [17] and the mean 92 infection duration for SARS is 1/ -./-= 3.8 days [18] . 93
The probability of a major outbreak [15, 16] can be estimated for each of the equally 95 possible distributions for the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation, 96
This can then be combined into a single estimate for the probability that an imported case 98 leads to sustained transmission, , given by 99
To include intensified surveillance in these estimates, we simply replaced the mean time 102 from symptom onset to hospitalisation for each of the equally plausible distributions, 1/ " , 103 by the modified expression (1 − )/ " . In this approximation, the parameter represents 104 the reduction in the mean infectious period due to intensified surveillance. 
RESULTS 114
As described in Methods, the distribution of times between symptom onset and 116 hospitalisation was estimated using Markov chain Monte Carlo ( Fig 1B) from the patient 117 data in Fig 1A. This gave rise to a range of equally plausible distributions describing these 118 time periods (blue lines in Fig 1B) . The average of these distributions is shown by the red 119 line in Fig 1B, however we used the full range of distributions in our calculations of the 120 probability of sustained transmission occurring from each imported case. 121
122
Each of the range of plausible distributions corresponded to an estimate for the probability 123 of a major epidemic (equation (1) and histogram in Fig 1C) . However, the probability of 124 sustained transmission in fact takes a single value, which can be estimated by summing 125 over the range of distributions using equation (2). The resulting probability of sustained 126 transmission is 0.37 (red line in Fig 1C) . 127
128
We then considered the reduction in the probability that an imported case leads to 129 sustained transmission if surveillance is more intense. Specifically, we assumed that 130 intensified surveillance led to a reduction in the mean period from symptom onset to 131 hospitalisation, governed by the parameter (where = 0 corresponds to no 132 intensification of surveillance, and = 1 corresponds to an implausible scenario in which 133 symptomatic cases are hospitalised immediately). We found that, if surveillance is 134 intensified so that the mean time from symptom onset to hospitalisation is halved, the 135 probability that each imported case leads to sustained transmission is reduced to only 136 0.005 ( Fig 1D) . 137
Finally, we considered the combined effect if multiple cases arrive in a new location. In 139 that scenario, intense surveillance has the potential to significantly reduce the risk of 140 sustained transmission compared to weak surveillance. For = 0.5, the probability that 141 any of 10 imported cases generate a substantial outbreak is only 0.049 ( Fig 2C) . This Chinese New Year presents a significant challenge, since this period often involves high 170 travel rates, potentially leading to importations of the virus to many new locations [3, 9] . to sustained transmission is approximately 0.37 ( Fig 1C) . However, under a higher level 178 of surveillance, the risk of sustained outbreaks is substantially lower (Fig 1D) . This result 179 is particularly striking when multiple cases travel to a new location, either simultaneously 180 or in sequence (Fig 2) . In that scenario, intensified surveillance is particularly important. 181 182 Our study involves the simplest possible model that permits the risk of sustained 183 transmission to be estimated from the very limited data that have been collected in this 184 outbreak until now. As additional information becomes available, for example data 185 describing virus transmissibility, then it will be possible to estimate the risk of outbreaks 186 in new locations with more precision. We made the assumption that symptom appearance 187 coincides with the onset of infectiousness. One of the features of the SARS outbreak in 
